Preserving the ‘Jewel of their Souls’: How North Carolina’s Common Law Could Save Cyber-Bullying Statutes by McGuire, Nick
MCGUIRE READY FOR ISSUE (DO NOT DELETE)  2/5/2018 4:06 PM 
 
 
PRESERVING THE ‘JEWEL OF 
THEIR SOULS’: HOW NORTH 
CAROLINA’S COMMON LAW 




In 2016, the North Carolina Supreme Court declared the State’s 
cyber-bullying statute unconstitutional because it violated the First 
Amendment right to free speech.2 The court held that North Carolina’s 
content-based restriction on speech was not narrowly tailored to serve 
the legitimate interest of protecting minors from online bullying.3 
Punishment for speech is viewed unfavorably by Americans, largely 
due to free speech’s important role in our nation’s history.4 
Nonetheless, legislatures occasionally criminalize acts with a speech 
component that are likely to threaten the social order and cause a 
breach of the peace.5 One such act is cyber-bullying.6 
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 1.  Good name in man and woman, dear my lord 
   Is the immediate jewel of their souls . . . 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act 3, sc. 3. 
 2.  State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814 (N.C. 2016). 
 3.  Id. at 822. 
 4.  See, e.g., Richard Wike, Americans more tolerant of offensive speech than others in the 
world, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 12, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2016/10/12/americans-more-tolerant-of-offensive-speech-than-others-in-the-world 
(explaining the place of free speech in the Bill of Rights and current views in support of free 
speech in the United States); Richard Wike, 5 ways Americans and Europeans are different, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/19/5-ways-americans-
and-europeans-are-different/ (comparing views on free speech between Germany and America, 
with Americans being more tolerant of free speech). 
 5.  See United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (explaining that content-based 
restrictions are allowed in limited situations). 
 6.  Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, State Cyberbullying Laws, CYBERBULLYING RES. 
CTR., (last updated Jan. 2016), https://cyberbullying.org/Bullying-and-Cyberbullying-Laws.pdf. 
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Cyber-bullying, bullying that occurs online, has become a growing 
problem in recent years, especially as much of adolescent social life has 
transitioned to online communities through social media networks.7 No 
longer is bullying confined to the stereotype of playground harassment 
during the school day. 
As with all societal and technological advances, the unforeseen 
ramifications of online conduct warrant reconsidering how the legal 
framework is equipped to deter such abuses. Cyber-bullying law is 
currently in a state of flux, where scholars and practitioners must 
consider a multitude of variables and adapt to the cyber-landscape’s 
constant change.8 
This Note examines North Carolina’s failed attempt to limit cyber-
bullying, starting with the enactment of a constitutionally flawed 
criminal statute and the North Carolina Supreme Court decision that 
ultimately invalidated it. Part I provides a brief overview of cyber-
bullying and the impetus for legislation across state governments. Part 
II discusses the facts and the North Carolina Supreme Court’s analysis 
in State v. Bishop. Part III proposes an alternative approach to address 
cyber-bullying through the common law torts of libel and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”). Part IV argues that, given the 
severe nature of the offense relative to today’s society, and the 
ineffectiveness of assigning punitive damages to the parents of cyber-
bullies, cyber-bullying should warrant criminal liability. Finally, Part V 
provides an example of a cyber-bullying statute that avoids the 
constitutional pitfalls found in North Carolina’s original statute. 
I. CYBER-BULLYING: AN OVERVIEW 
 
Cyber-bullying has several definitions, none more straightforward 
than “bullying that takes place using electronic technology.”9 All 
definitions specify that the victim be a child, preteen, or teenager,10 
 
 7.  Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying fact sheet: Identification, 
Prevention, and Response, CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. (Oct. 2014), 
http://cyberbullying.org/ Cyberbullying _Identification_Prevention_Response.pdf. 95% of teens 
in the United States are regularly online, and 74% access the internet on their mobile device. Id. 
 8.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF ED., Key Policy Letters from the Education Secretary and 
Deputy Secretary (Dec. 16, 2010), https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/secletter/101215.html 
(explaining continuing strategies and stakeholders for developing cyberbullying laws). 
 9.  U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Effects of Bullying (Sept. 12, 2017), 
http://www.stopbullying.gov/at-risk/effects/. 
 10.  See, e.g., What is Cyberbullying?, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, 
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while most definitions state that the offender must also be a minor.11 If 
adults become involved, the acts are often considered “cyber-
harassment” or “cyber-stalking.”12 This difference is grounded in the 
common understanding of traditional bullying.13 
Electronic technology includes devices such as cell phones, 
computers, and tablets, as well as services like social media sites, text 
messages, chat, and websites.14 As the technology landscape continues 
to change, so too will the avenues for cyber-bullying. 
The use of electronic technology distinguishes cyber-bullying from 
bullying in many ways. Cyber-bullying can occur anywhere a victim has 
access to the internet.15 This means that even a child’s home, the place 
in which a child should feel most safe, becomes vulnerable. The abuse 
of such technology also allows for cyber-bullies to say things that they 
would not say in person,16 to reach an audience that they would not 
reach in person,17 and even to hide behind anonymity.18 Unlike 
traditional bullying, cyber-bullying can be inescapable, extending well 
past the school day; as more of social life transitions to the internet, it 
becomes increasingly difficult for children to simply “log off” to ignore 
cyber-bullies.19 
Cyber-bullying has severe and concerning effects on children. 
Studies show that cyber-bullying victims experience significantly lower 
levels of self-esteem, decreased academic performance, and increased 
delinquent behavior.20 There is also a strong correlation between 
 
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/cyberbullying/what-is-cyberbullying (last visited Oct. 12, 2017); What 
is cyberbullying exactly? STOP CYBERBULLYING, http://www.stopcyberbullying.org 
/what_is_cyberbullying_exactly.html (last visited Oct. 12, 2017). 
 11.  See What is cyberbullying exactly?, supra note 10. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  What is Bullying?, CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR., https://cyberbullying.org/what-is-
bullying (last visited Oct. 12, 2017) (“Bullying is any unwanted aggressive behavior(s) by another 
youth or group of youths who are not siblings or current dating partners that involves an observed 
or perceived power imbalance and is repeated multiple times or is highly likely to be repeated. 
Bullying may inflict harm or distress on the targeted youth including physical, psychological, 
social, or educational harm.”). 
 14.  Cyber Bullying, SAFER TOMORROWS, https://www.safertomorrows.com/get-help/cyber-
bullying/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2017). 
 15.  What is Cyberbullying?, supra note 10. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Cyberbullying research summary: Cyberbullying 
and Self-Esteem, CYBERBULLYING RES. CTR. (2010), http://cyberbullying.org/ 
cyberbullying_and_self_esteem_research_fact_sheet.pdf; see also Naomi Harlin Goodno, How 
Public Schools Can Constitutionally Halt Cyberbullying: A Model Cyberbullying Policy That 
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experiencing cyber-bullying and increased levels of depression.21 
Furthermore, cyber-bullying victims are just as likely as victims of 
traditional bullying to have suicidal thoughts and actions.22 
Similar to traditional bullying, many state legislatures have 
authorized school boards to implement cyber-bullying policies to 
regulate communication on school grounds or through technology 
provided by the school.23 Although the Supreme Court has stated that 
schools may prohibit on-campus speech that “might reasonably [lead] 
school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities”24 or that interferes “with the rights 
of other students to be secure and to be let alone,”25 electronic 
technology and the rise of social media has complicated the line 
between on-campus speech and off-campus speech.26 The Supreme 
Court has not addressed whether schools can regulate speech that 
originates off campus but affects the environment on campus. As a 
result, the lower courts are split as to whether schools can regulate off-
campus speech, and if so, under what circumstances.27 
Framing cyber-bullying as an educational issue has both its benefits 
and disadvantages. Using the recognized power of public schools to 
regulate on-campus speech grounds the issue in constitutional 
authorization.28 However, the applicability of this power to cyber-
speech that arises off-campus raises new First Amendment issues. Even 
if the Court addresses these issues and holds that schools can regulate 
off-campus speech, limiting the issue of cyber-bullying to the schools 
 
Considers First Amendment, Due Process, And Fourth Amendment Challenges, 46 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 641, 645 (2011). 
 21.  Michele P. Hamm et al., Prevalence and Effect of Cyberbullying on Children and Young 
People, 169 JAMA PEDIATR. 770–777 (2015). 
 22.  Sameer Hinduja & Justin W. Patchin, Bullying, Cyberbullying, and Suicide, 14 ARCH. 
SUICIDE RES. 206–221 (2010). 
 23.  Cyberbullying research summary: Cyberbullying and Self-Esteem, supra note 20. 
 24.  Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) . 
 25.  Id. at 508. 
 26.  See Clay Calvert, Punishing Public School Students For Bashing Principals, Teachers & 
Classmates In Cyberspace: The Speech Issue The Supreme Court Must Now Resolve, 7 FIRST 
AMEND. L. REV. 210, 213 (2009). 
 27.  See Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2015); Kowalski v. Berkeley 
Cty. Schs. 652 F.3d 565, 537 (4th Cir. 2011); Layshock v. Hermitage Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 205 (3d 
Cir. 2011); J.S. ex rel. Snyder v. Blue Mountain Sch. Dist., 650 F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2011); Doninger 
v. Niehoff 527 F.3d 41, 48 (2d Cir. 2008); LaVine v. Blaine Sch. Dist., 257 F.3d 981, 988 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 28.  See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 401 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 274 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986); 
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509. 
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overlooks those children who are not enrolled in school and overlooks 
the periods of time that school is not in session. 
Congress and state legislatures have enacted or attempted to enact 
criminal cyber-bullying legislation, many of which are named in honor 
of cyber-bullying victims whom took their own lives.29 In 2009, the 
North Carolina General Assembly addressed the effects of cyber-
bullying by passing House Bill 1261, also known as the Protect Our 
Kids/Cyber Bullying Misdemeanor Act.30 The bill was codified into 
Chapter 14 of the North Carolina General Statutes, which frames the 
offense as a computer crime akin to damaging computers31 and 
computer trespass.32 Under the statute, it is “unlawful for any person to 
use a computer or computer network to . . . [p]ost or encourage others 
to post on the Internet private, personal, or sexual information 
pertaining to a minor” with “the intent to intimidate or torment a 
minor.”33 
II. STATE V. BISHOP: FACTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. Facts of the Case 
One morning in September 2011, Dillon Price received a Facebook 
notification.34 Price, then a sophomore at Southern Alamance High 
School in North Carolina, opened the Facebook application on his 
phone to discover that several classmates had posted offensive and 
vulgar comments and pictures of him.35 Unfortunately, these posts were 
the first in a consistent stream of similar behavior from his classmates 
that continued for months.36 Among the classmates was Robert Bishop, 
who posted several vulgar and threatening comments about Price, 
including a screenshot of a sexually themed text message that Price had 
accidentally sent him.37 Many of the messages included comments and 
accusations about Price’s sexual orientation, along with other name-
calling and insults.38 
 
 29.  State Cyberbullying Laws, supra note 6. 
 30.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2012). 
 31.  Id. § 14-455. 
 32.  Id. § 14-458. 
 33.  Id. § 14-458.1(a)(1)(d). 
 34.  State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 815 (N.C. 2016). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  Id. at 816. 
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The constant Facebook commentary eventually became 
emotionally and physically overwhelming for Price. One night in 
December 2011, Price’s mother found him crying, punching his pillow, 
and physically harming himself.39 Price’s mother confiscated his phone, 
discovered the Facebook comments, and subsequently contacted local 
law enforcement.40 
After conducting an undercover investigation, the Alamance 
County Sherriff’s Office arrested Bishop and charged him with one 
count of cyber-bullying under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14–458.1(a)(1)(d).41 
B. Lower Court Proceedings 
At trial, the State introduced three exhibits as evidence—each a 
separate screenshot of a Facebook post and its respective comments.42 
The first exhibit consisted of a Facebook post that included both a 
screenshot of a text message Price had accidentally sent to a classmate 
and a series of over 30 comments from a variety of individuals in 
reference to the screenshot.43 Among those comments were four from 
Bishop: (1) “This is excessively homoerotic in nature. Exquisite 
specimen;” (2) “Anyone who would be so defensive over Dillon can’t 
be too intelligent;” (3) “And you are equally pathetic for taking the 
internet so seriously;” and (4) “There isn’t a fight. We’re slamming 
someone on the open forum that is the internet.”44 
The second exhibit was another Facebook post containing a 
screenshot of a text message conversation between Price and a 
classmate.45 In the comment section, several classmates stated that they 
hated Dillon.46 In response to a comment that said, “Can we just kick 
his ass already,” Bishop replied, “I never got to slap him down before 
Christmas break.”47 
The third exhibit was another Facebook post containing a 
screenshot of a text message conversation between Dillon and a 
classmate.48 One of the text messages included a digitally-altered 
 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–458.1(a)(1)(d) (2012). 
 42.  State v. Bishop, 774 S.E.2d 337, 341 (N.C. Ct. App. 2015). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  Id. 
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picture of Dillon and his dog, prompting students to post vulgar and 
derogatory comments in response.49 Bishop posted several comments, 
including: “I heard that his anus was permanently stressed from having 
awkwardly shaped penises in it” and that Dillon’s genitals were 
“probably a triangle.”50 
The court denied Bishop’s motion to dismiss, and he was eventually 
convicted by a jury of one count of cyber-bullying.51 Bishop was 
sentenced to four years supervised probation.52 
Bishop appealed the conviction, arguing that the statute restricted 
speech protected by the First Amendment; that this restriction was 
content based; and that it swept too broadly to satisfy the demands of 
strict scrutiny analysis.53 The North Carolina Court of Appeals 
concluded that the statute did not regulate speech, but rather that it 
“punishe[d] the act of posting or encouraging another to post on the 
Internet with the intent to intimidate or torment” a minor.54 
C. North Carolina Supreme Court Ruling 
On August 20, 2015, the North Carolina Supreme Court granted 
Bishop’s petition for discretionary review.55 When considering the 
constitutionality of the statute, the court determined that: (1) the 
statute restricted speech and not conduct; (2) the restricted speech was 
content-based; and (3) the statute did not embody the least restrictive 
means of serving North Carolina’s compelling interest in protecting 
minors from harm; thus, the statute failed the strict scrutiny analysis.56 
The court identified several problems with the cyber-bullying statute 
that led it to its conclusion: the statute did not require the subject of 
any online posts to experience actual harm,57 the requisite intent 
(“intimidate” and “torment”) was too broad,58 and the description of 
 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Id. 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 343. 
 55.  State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 815 (N.C. 2016). 
 56.  Id. “Strict scrutiny is a form of judicial review that courts use to determine the 
constitutionality of certain laws. To pass strict scrutiny, the legislature must have passed the law 
to further a ‘compelling governmental interest,’ and must have narrowly tailored the law to 
achieve that interest.” Strict Scrutiny, Wex Legal Dictionary (2016), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/strict_scrutiny (last visited Nov. 11, 2017). 
 57.  Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 815. 
 58.  Id. at 821. 
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the conduct was too expansive.59 Although the court found the statute’s 
purpose laudable, it ultimately held that the cyber-bullying statute had 
“create[d] a criminal prohibition of alarming breadth.”60 The court 
declared that the statute violated the First Amendment right to 
freedom of speech, and thus reversed the court of appeals.61 
III. ESTABLISHING A COMMON LAW BACKDROP TO CYBER-
BULLYING LEGISLATION 
 
In light of the threats to free expression posed by content-based 
restrictions, the Supreme Court of the United States has rejected a 
“free-floating test for First Amendment coverage . . . [based on] an ad 
hoc balancing of relative social costs and benefits” as “startling and 
dangerous.”62 But restrictions on speech have generally been permitted 
when confined to the few “historic and traditional categories [of 
expression] long familiar to the bar,” such as fighting words, obscenity, 
incitement, and defamation.63 These categories have a historical 
foundation in the Court’s free speech tradition.64 Adherence to these 
established categories and rules allows the vast realm of protected 
speech and free thought to thrive.65 
Although the interest that North Carolina’s defunct cyber-bullying 
statute meant to address—the protection of children from bullying—is 
a compelling interest, the statute’s structure ran afoul of the First 
Amendment by punishing content-based speech.66 The First 
Amendment’s content-based speech discrimination doctrine examines 
whether government action falls within the narrow range of situations 
in which the freedom of speech can be overridden by the government’s 
interest.67 The strict scrutiny analysis employed in Bishop seeks to limit 
the government’s ability to suppress otherwise protected speech.68 
 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 
U.S. 460, 470 (2010)). 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. at 718. 
 66.  Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 822. 
 67.  Id. at 819. 
 68.  Id. 
MCGUIRE READY FOR ISSUE (DO NOT DELETE) 2/5/2018  4:06 PM 
2018] PRESERVING THE ‘JEWEL OF THEIR SOULS’ 65 
In contrast, the categories the Supreme Court has recognized, 
which include the dignitary torts of defamation (both libel and slander) 
and IIED, address important and legitimate interests unrelated to the 
suppression of protected speech and are compatible with the First 
Amendment if properly constructed.69 If the North Carolina General 
Assembly were to redraft a cyber-bullying bill, carefully framing the 
issue of cyber-bullying in terms of dignitary torts and confinining the 
definition within the constitutional boundaries developed by the 
Supreme Court, then that bill could withstand a Bishop-like 
constitutional challenge. 
A. Supreme Court Considerations and Limitations 
Beginning in the mid-twentieth century, the Supreme Court 
assumed the task of resolving the conflict between states’ dignitary tort 
law and the First Amendment’s freedom of speech.70 The Court’s 
decisions display a meticulous consideration of the competing interests, 
resulting in a nuanced balancing to determine whether tortious speech 
is protected by the Constitution. The Court focused largely on two 
factors—the nature of the plaintiff and the nature of the speech—in 
reaching its conclusions. 
1. Nature of the Plaintiff 
The Supreme Court initially confronted the tension between the 
First Amendment and tortious speech in the 1964 landmark case, New 
York Times v. Sullivan.71 In New York Times, the Court established that 
the First Amendment prevents a “public official from recovering 
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct 
unless he proves that the statement was made with actual malice—that 
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether 
it was false or not.”72 
The Court has repeatedly upheld the New York Times definition of 
“actual malice” when deciding defamation cases.73 Furthermore, it has 
clarified that “actual malice” is a term of art, created to “provide a 
 
 69.  See, e.g., Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017); Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451 
(2011). 
 70.  See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 256 (1964). 
 71.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 279–80. 
 73.  See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 284 (1971); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 
727, 728 (1968); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 397 (1967); Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 87 
(1966); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1964). 
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convenient shorthand expression for the standard of liability that must 
be established before a State may constitutionally permit public 
officials to recover for libel in actions brought against publishers”74 and 
thus “should not be confused with the concept of malice as an evil 
intent or a motive arising from spite or ill will.”75 
The Court has held that “reckless disregard” within the meaning of 
the New York Times rule can be measured by whether the publisher 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication and still 
published with a “high degree of awareness of probable falsity.”76 
However, the Court was careful to assert that “reckless disregard” 
cannot be held to one infallible definition; its outer limits will be 
defined on a case-by-case basis.77 
Determination of a person’s status as a “public official” is a matter 
of federal rather than state law.78 The Court has held that the “‘public 
official’ designation applies at the very least to those among the 
hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public 
to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of 
governmental affairs,”79 and that “the employee’s position must be one 
which would invite public scrutiny and discussion of the person holding 
it, entirely apart from the scrutiny and discussion occasioned by the 
particular charges in controversy.”80 
In Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,81 the Court extended the New York 
Times rule of “actual malice” to public figures who were not public 
officials.82 In that case, the Court defined a “public figure” as one who 
commands a substantial amount of public interest by his position alone, 
or one who has thrust himself by purposeful activity into the vortex of 
an important public controversy.83 Later, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, 
Inc.,84 the Court held that a public figure within the New York Times 
 
 74.  Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245, 251 (1974). 
 75.  Masson v. New Yorker Mag., 501 U.S. 496, 510 (1991). 
 76.  St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 730. 
 77.  See id. (“[N]evertheless it is clear that reckless conduct is not measured by whether a 
reasonably prudent person would have published, or would have investigated before publishing; 
rather, there must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact 
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the publication.”). 
 78.  Rosenblatt, 383 U.S. at 84. 
 79.  Id. at 85. 
 80.  Id. at 86 n.13. 
 81.  388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). 
 82.  Id. at 134. 
 83.  Id. at 154–55. 
 84.  418 U.S. 323 (1974) 
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rule to be either “an individual [who] may achieve such pervasive fame 
or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all 
contexts”85 or “an individual [who] voluntarily injects himself or is 
drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a 
public figure for a limited range of issues.”86 The Court noted that an 
individual should not be deemed a public figure for all aspects of his or 
her life without “clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the 
community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society.”87 
In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,88 the Court held that the First 
Amendment precludes public figures and public officials from 
recovering for an IIED claim unless they show that the publication 
contains a false statement of fact which was made with “actual malice,” 
as understood in the New York Times rule.89 It reasoned that a state’s 
interest in protecting public figures from emotional distress is not 
sufficient to deny First Amendment protection to speech that is 
offensive and is intended to inflict emotional injury.90 However, the 
Court did not eradicate IIED completely, even for public figures. The 
tailored nature of its holding meant the Court left open the possibility 
that a public figure could prevail on an IIED claim on a showing that 
the defendant acted with actual malice. Furthermore, the Court said 
nothing of private individuals succeeding in an IIED claim. 
Ten years after New York Times, the Court examined the 
constitutional limits on defamation suits brought by private 
individuals.91 In Gertz, the Court held that “States may define for 
themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or 
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private 
individual.”92 However, because “the constitutional requirement of 
fault supersedes the common law’s presumptions as to fault and 
damages,”93 the Court mandated that States cannot impose liability 
without fault. 
Since New York Times, the Supreme Court has adapted and 
extended its ruling that the First Amendment prohibits a public official 
 
 85.  Id. at 351. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 352. 
 88.  485 U.S. 46 (1988). 
 89.  Id. at 56. 
 90.  Id. at 50. 
 91.  See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1996). 
 92.  Id. at 347. 
 93.  See Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986) (discussing Gertz). 
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from recovering damages for a defamation claim absent “actual 
malice.” In doing so, the Court has created a framework that stresses 
the importance of the plaintiff’s status as a “public” person—either as 
a “public official” or a “public figure”—versus a private individual. If 
the plaintiff of a defamation suit falls within the “public” category of 
persons, he or she cannot recover damages unless he or she can show 
that the publication was made with “actual malice.” However, if the 
plaintiff is a private individual, the Constitution only requires a level of 
fault higher than strict liability to recover damages. 
2. Nature of the Speech 
A plurality of the justices clarified in Dun & Bradstreet v. 
Greenmoss Builders94 that when a defamation suit involved not only a 
private individual, but also speech of purely private concern, the 
showing of “actual malice” was unnecessary.95 In doing so, the Court 
effectively created a second measure by which to evaluate defamation’s 
constitutional limitations.96 However, one can trace the Court’s 
distinction back to Sullivan, in which the Court declared that 
“uninhibited, robust, and wide-open” debate on public issues is the 
very essence of self-government and is a central purpose of the First 
Amendment.97 Writing for the Court, Justice Powell expressed the view 
that “speech on matters of purely private concern is of less First 
Amendment concern,” because laws that restrict private speech pose 
“no threat to the free and robust debate of public issues; there is no 
potential interference with a meaningful dialogue of ideas concerning 
self-government; and there is no threat of liability causing a reaction of 
self-censorship by the press.”98 The Court later affirmed the plurality’s 
rule in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,99 in which it further 
articulated that, in defamation suits involving private individuals, but 
also utterances of public concern, the plaintiff must bear the burden of 
showing fault and falsity to recover damages.100 
 
 94.  472 U.S. 749 (1985). 
 95.  Id. at 753. 
 96.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270–74 (1964). 
 97.  Id. 
 98.  Id. at 760. 
 99.  475 U.S. 767 (1986). 
 100.  Id. at 776. The public concern in Hepps stemmed from a series of articles reporting that 
a beverage-store chain and its principal stockholder had links to organized crime and used such 
links to influence governmental decisions. Id. 
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The Court most recently considered the nature of tortious speech 
in Snyder v. Phelps,101 in which the father of a deceased marine brought 
an IIED suit against the group protesting and picketing at his son’s 
funeral.102 The Court stressed that its decisions as to whether Snyder 
could recover damages for an IIED claim “turn[ed] largely on whether 
that speech is of public or private concern, as determined by all the 
circumstances of the case.”103 A matter of public concern, according to 
the Court, is “any matter of political, social, or other concern to the 
community, or when it is a subject of legitimate news interest.”104 To 
determine whether speech is a “matter of public concern,” the Court 
looked to the content, form, and context of the statements.105 Because 
the group was well known for picking military funerals to convey its 
belief that God hates the United States for its acceptance of 
homosexuality,106 especially in the military, the Court concluded that 
the content of the speech related to the issues of interest to society at 
large, and thus was protected by the First Amendment.107 
Cases like Dun & Bradstreet and Snyder provide a second layer of 
analysis for tortious speech. The Court’s rulings underscored the 
importance of determining whether speech involves matters of public 
or private concern when drawing lines at the crossroads of the First 
Amendment and state common law. While “speech on public issues 
occupies the ‘highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values’ 
and is entitled to special protection,”108 speech concerning private 
issues is not afforded such protection. 
3. Current Framework 
The case law up to this point suggests that courts should consider 
the circumstances of each case when deciding a matter where state tort 
law and First Amendment protection conflict. The Supreme Court has 
primarily focused on two sets of factors resulting in four distinct 
categories of circumstances: (1) Public figure-Public concern,109 (2) 
 
 101.  562 U.S. 443 (2011). 
 102.  Id. at 443. 
 103.  Id. at 444. 
 104.  Id. (citing Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 (1985)). 
 105.  Id. 
 106.  Id. at 445–55. 
 107.  Id. at 454. Justice Alito was the Court’s lone dissenter, writing that the Constitution did 
not allow Westboro to “brutalize” the Snyder family with hateful messages even if they were in a 
public setting. Id. at 463–75 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 108.  Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 759 (citations omitted). 
 109.  See N.Y. Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 298–99 (1964). 
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Public figure-Private concern,110 (3) Private individual-Public 
concern,111 and (4) Private individual-Private concern.112 
When the plaintiff is a public figure and the speech is of a public 
concern, the law holds that the plaintiff must demonstrate “actual 
malice” before he or she can recover damages under common law 
defamation.113 When the plaintiff is a public figure, but the speech is not 
of public concern, the courts also require the plaintiff demonstrate 
“actual malice” to prevail, at least in an IIED claim.114 When the speech 
is of public concern, but the plaintiff is a private figure, “the 
Constitution still supplants the standards of the common law, but the 
constitutional requirements are, in at least some of their range, less 
forbidding.”115 Finally, when the plaintiff is a private individual and the 
speech is of private concern, “the state interest in compensating private 
individuals for injury to their reputation adequately supports awards of 
presumed and punitive damages, even absent a showing of actual 
malice,” in accordance with the state’s common law.116 This last 
category is most analogous to Bishop and to typical instance of cyber-
bullying: the plaintiffs are private individuals and the speech is not a 
legitimate matter of public concern. In these cases, the circumstances 
most resemble Dun & Bradstreet, and thus the First Amendment only 
compels states to apply a level of fault higher than strict liability to its 
common law rules. 
B. North Carolina’s Common Law 
1. Libel 
The common law applies with full force in North Carolina. Unless 
modified or repealed by the General Assembly or the courts, the 
“common law” is applied as it existed when North Carolina became a 
state in 1776.117 
North Carolina recognizes three classes of libel: (1) publications 
that are obviously defamatory are called libel per se; (2) publications 
 
 110.  The Supreme Court has not yet decided a case that fits this particular set of 
circumstances. 
 111.  See Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 463 (2011). 
 112.  See Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 775. 
 113.  See N.Y. Times, 376 U.S. 254 at 279–80. 
 114.  See Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). 
 115.  Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 775 (1986). 
 116.  Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 749. 
 117.  Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711 (N.C. 1988) (quoting Bruton v. Enters., Inc., 160 S.E.2d 482, 
494 (1968)); see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4-1 (1986). 
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that are susceptible of two interpretations, one of which is defamatory 
and the other not; and (3) publications that are not obviously 
defamatory, but when considered with innuendo, colloquium, and 
explanatory circumstances, become libelous are called libels per 
quod.118 In traditional common law, when an authorized publication is 
libelous per se, damages are presumed from the fact of publication and 
no proof is required as to any resulting injury.119 
Publication includes any writing, printing, signs, or pictures which, 
when considered alone without innuendo, colloquium or explanatory 
circumstances: (1) charge that a person has committed an infamous 
crime; (2) charge a person with having an infectious disease; (3) tend to 
impeach a person in that person’s trade or profession; or (4) otherwise 
tend to subject one to ridicule, contempt or disgrace.120 Otherwise put, 
defamatory words must disgrace and degrade the party or hold him or 
her up to public hatred, contempt or ridicule, or cause him to be 
shunned and avoided.121 
In determining whether publications are susceptible to only one 
defamatory meaning, the principle of common sense requires that 
courts understand them as the average person would. The question 
always is “how would ordinary men naturally understand the 
publication.”122 The fact that “supersensitive persons with morbid 
imaginations may be able, by reading between the lines of an article, to 
discover some defamatory meaning therein is not sufficient to make 
them libelous.”123 
2.  IIED 
Under North Carolina law, the essential elements of an IIED claim 
are: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) which is intended to cause 
and does cause (3) severe emotional distress.124 
Whether conduct is sufficiently extreme and outrageous to support 
an action for IIED is a question of law for the court.125 Extreme and 
 
 118.  Renwick v. News & Observer Pub. Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 408 (N.C. 1984) (quoting Arnold 
v. Sharpe, 251 S.E.2d 452, 455 (1979)). 
 119.  Id. 
 120.  Id. at 409 (quoting Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 195 S.E. 55, 60 (N.C. 1938)). 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 123.  Id. 
 124.  Rouse v. Duke Univ., 914 F. Supp. 2d 717, 728 (M.D.N.C. 2012), aff’d, 2013 WL 3828308 
(4th Cir. 2012) (applying North Carolina Law). 
 125.  Emmons v. Roses’s Stores, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 2d. 358, 365 (E.D.N.C. 1997), aff’d, 141 F.3d 
1158 (4th Cir. 1998) (applying North Carolina law). 
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outrageous conduct includes acts that “exceed all bounds usually 
tolerated by a decent society.”126 In making this determination, courts 
have noted that the foreseeability of injury, while not itself an element 
of IIED, is a factor to consider when calculating the outrageousness of 
the conduct.127 
Intent to physically injure is not essential to satisfy a claim of IIED. 
Therefore, the perpetrator of a practical joke is liable for a resulting 
foreseeable injury.128 Additionally, IIED may be established when a 
defendant’s actions indicate a reckless indifference to the likelihood 
that they will cause severe emotional distress.129 For IIED, “severe 
emotional distress means any type of severe and disabling emotional 
or mental condition which may be generally recognized and diagnosed 
by professionals trained to do so.”130 This means any “emotional or 
mental disorder, such as . . . neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, [or] 
phobia.”131 When considering if the resulting distress is severe, courts 
have looked to the intensity and duration as factors.132 
C. Libel and IIED Applied to Cyber-Bullying 
Victims of school-related cyber-bullying are often private 
individuals dealing with matters of private concern, and thus resemble 
those in the Supreme Court’s tortious speech category that largely 
defers to the common law rules for recovering damages. It follows that, 
if cyber-bullying is sufficiently analogous to libel and IIED, victims of 
cyber-bullying should be able to recover damages as well. Although 
aspects of both libel and IIED can be found in acts of cyber-bullying, 
the similarities do not necessarily make them the synonymous. Cyber-
bullying is a relatively new phenomenon, and thus any attempt to 
analogize it with centuries-old common law torts deserves a thorough 
analysis. Relating each element of the respective torts with the act of 
cyber-bullying shows the comparison to be complicated. 
Although North Carolina’s libel per se traditionally presumed a 
defendant was acting with malice133—that is, the colloquial use of 
 
 126.  Glenn v. Johnson 787 S.E.2d 65, 72 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). 
 127.  Turner v. Thomas, 794 S.E.2d 439, 446 (N.C. 2016). 
 128.  Langford v. Shu, 128 S.E.2d 210, 211–12 (N.C. 1962). 
 129.  Turner, 794 S.E.2d at 446. 
 130.  Mullis v. Mechanics & Farmers Bank, 994 F. Supp. 680, 689 (M.D.N.C. 1997). 
 131.  Owens v. Dixie Motor Co., 2013 WL 3490395, at *4 (E.D.N.C. 2013). 
 132.  Strickland v. Jewell, 562 F. Supp. 2d 661, 676 (M.D.N.C. 2007). 
 133.  Renwick v. News & Observer Pub. Co., 312 S.E.2d 405, 408 (N.C. 1984) (citations 
omitted). 
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“malice,” not the New York Times “actual malice” term of art—the 
Dun & Bradstreet framework requires a level of fault higher than this 
presumed strict liability even in cases concerning private plaintiffs and 
private concerns. Thus, North Carolina’s common law libel per se must 
adapt to allow express findings of malice.134 North Carolina’s IIED law, 
by comparison, includes a heightened mens rea element, and thus, is 
unaffected by the Supreme Court’s limitations in cases of private 
plaintiffs and private concerns. At first glance, the “intent to cause 
severe emotional distress” resembles both a general depiction of 
bullying and the North Carolina statute’s “intent to intimidate or 
torment.” However, after Bishop’s lawyers noted that the statute did 
not define “intimidate” or “torment,”135 the State argued that the court 
should define torment broadly to reference contact that annoyed, 
pestered, or harassed.136 Not only does this definition fall far below 
“intent to cause severe emotional distress” as it pertains to North 
Carolina’s IIED law, but it undermines the actual severity of cyber-
bullying. Cyber-bullying encompasses a broad range of activity, but, to 
withstand constitutional challenges, the law should err on the side of 
punishing malicious intent to cause severe harm rather than attempting 
to protect people from online annoyances. 
Common law IIED encompasses a broad array of acts, so long as 
they may be considered “extreme and outrageous conduct.” In 
contrast, libel requires a publication, which, in today’s technological 
landscape, includes various forms of internet activity. Moreover, 
because society generally condemns bullying, it can be considered 
extreme and outrageous conduct.137 Therefore, cyber-bullying as an act 
can embody elements of both extreme and outrageous conduct and 
publication. 
Both IIED and libel seek to address particular harms caused by 
such acts. Victims of libel are disgraced, ridiculed, and held in contempt 
as a result of the preceding malicious publication. Victims of IIED have 
suffered severe emotional distress as a result of conduct intended to 
 
 134.  See Ellis v. Northern Star Co. 388 S.E.2d 127, 129 (N.C. 1990) (“We note at the outset 
that, since the jury expressly found that the defendants acted with actual malice, this case does 
not present the issue of whether damages may be presumed in libel per se actions absent a finding 
of malice, as this Court has held in previous cases . . . . Certain cases decided by the Supreme 
Court of the United States give rise to a question as to whether North Carolina can continue the 
common law presumption of damages in libel per se actions absent express findings of malice.”). 
 135.  State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 820–21 (N.C. 2016). 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  See Glenn v. Johnson, 787 S.E.2d 65, 72 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016). 
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cause such distress. The North Carolina statute, however, failed to 
include any harm element whatsoever.138 The statute did not even 
require the target of the cyber-bullying to be aware that the content 
exists.139 This downplays the numerous tangible harms directly caused 
by cyber-bullying, including mental and physical problems, decreased 
academic achievement, increased anxiety and depression, changes in 
eating and sleeping patterns, increased likelihood of skipping school or 
dropping out, physical retaliation, and frequent suicidal thoughts or 
actions.140 Moreover, to avoid potential due process challenges, 
especially when attempting to address a broadly defined problem like 
cyber-bullying, a statute must require harm to occur.141 
The analogy is not perfect, but it does not have to be. The mens rea 
of a civil tort for cyber-bullying may fall between libel’s “anything but 
strict liability” requirement and IIED’s “intent to cause severe 
emotional distress.” Cyber-bullying can take many forms, some of 
which fit under IIED’s “extreme and outrageous conduct” definition,142 
and many of which include libel’s “publication” definition. Most 
importantly, cyber-bullying has the ability to cause the underlying 
harms addressed by each tort: severe emotional distress, ridicule, 
contempt, or disgrace. At the very least, because North Carolina can 
address the underlying harms caused by cyber-bullying without 
running afoul of the First Amendment, it should be able to legally 
address the act of cyber-bullying in some meaningful way as well. 
IV. THE CASE FOR CRIMINALIZING CYBER-BULLYING 
North Carolina allows punitive damages in civil libel and IIED 
lawsuits to punish offenders and to deter others from committing 
similar offenses in the future.143 Many states, including North Carolina, 
already criminalize similar non-physical harms such as stalking and 
 
 138.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1 (2012). 
 139.  Id.; see Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 820. 
 140.  U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 9. 
 141.  Cf. State v. Packingham, 748 S.E.2d 146, 153 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (“Expansively written 
laws designed to protect children are not exempt from the constitutional requirement of clarity 
under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause.”). 
 142.  Because “extreme and outrageous conduct” is any conduct deemed inexcusable by 
society, and because society has universally condemned bullying, bullying falls under the 
definition of “extreme and outrageous conduct” as it pertains to IIED. See Glenn, 787 S.E.2d at 
72. 
 143.  See Brian Timothy Beasley, North Carolina’s New Punitive Damages Statute: Who’s 
Being Punished, Anyway?, 74 N.C. L. REV. 2174, 2175 (1996). 
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harassing to deter these acts.144 Some of these statutes expressly include 
online activity, while others have been later applied to online activity 
in the absence of a cyber-bullying statute.145 While only a few examples 
of criminal libel and IIED statutes exist, the drafters of the Model Penal 
Code provide an argument in support of criminalizing those offenses.146 
Accordingly, because cyber-bullying laws seek to punish and deter the 
same harms as criminal libel and IIED do, states should be able to 
directly criminalize cyber-bullying. 
A. Insufficiency of Monetary Damages 
The harms addressed in libel and IIED actions are similar to those 
experienced by cyber-bullying victims.147 It follows that the means of 
compensating victims of such harms should be similar as well. Although 
the civil liability status of libel and IIED allow for a variety of monetary 
damages, the particular status of cyber-bullying victims and cyber-
bullies themselves as minors leaves open the probability that monetary 
damages will not effectively punish cyber-bullies nor deter cyber-
bullying. 
North Carolina allows compensatory damages for plaintiffs in libel 
and IIED cases.148 Compensatory damages include (1) pecuniary loss 
direct or indirect, or special damages, (2) damages for physical pain and 
inconvenience, (3) damages for mental suffering, and (4) damages for 
injury to reputation.149 Additionally, the North Carolina legislature 
authorized a trier of fact to award punitive damages in appropriate 
cases to punish egregiously wrongful acts and to deter both the 
defendant and others from committing such acts in the future.150 
These rationales introduce a problem with respect to the parties 
involved in cyber-bullying situations. When a tortfeasor is an adult, he 
or she is liable, absent any established doctrines of vicarious liability. 
This is not the same for a child tortfeasor. North Carolina law allows 
 
 144.  See infra text accompanying notes 157–166. 
 145.  See Brian S. Brazeau, The Transformation Of Indirect Harassment In The 21st Century: 
Harassment Telephone Laws, Cyberbullying, And New Ways Of Analyzing First Amendment 
Rights, 22 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 292 (2016–2017); George L. Blum, Validity, 
Construction, and Application of State and Municipal Criminal and Civil Cyberbullying Laws, 26 
A.L.R. Art. 4 (7th ed. 2017). 
 146.  See infra text accompanying notes 173–175. 
 147.  See infra Part I. 
 148.  See, e.g., R. H. Bouligny, Inc. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 154 S.E.2d 344, 353–54 
(N.C. 1967); Wilson v. Pearce, 412 S.E.2d 148, 155 (N.C. Ct. App. 1992). 
 149.  Hien Nguyen v. Taylor, 723 S.E.2d 551, 559 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012). 
 150.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1D-1 (1996). 
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for injured persons to recover actual or nominal damages from the 
parents of minors who act maliciously or willfully in some respects, but 
the law is silent with respect to punitive damages.151 
The purpose of assigning damages to parents is to compensate 
innocent victims and to oblige parents to stop their child’s behavior.152 
Another rationale for parental liability assumes that the parents’ 
inaction is the cause of the delinquency and thus the parent should be 
punished for bad parenting.153 However, legal experts have raised 
numerous issues with assigning parental liability for any malfeasance 
resulting from a child’s unsupervised use of the internet.154 It is 
unreasonable to expect, as technology becomes more engrained in 
everyday life, that even a diligent parent will be able to monitor and 
sufficiently curtail a child’s internet use. Courts recognized this long 
before the prevalence of social networks, as it dealt with issues of 
copyright infringement and access to pornographic websites.155 
Furthermore, parenting is far from the only factor to a bully’s behavior. 
Numerous studies show that socioeconomic status and biology can 
contribute to the bullying mentality.156 Furthermore, punishing a parent 
for a child’s bullying with monetary damages does not provide the 
desired deterrence. The parent pays that price, which only indirectly 
punishes the child, if the parent chooses to do so. Thus, punitive 
monetary damages do not adequately punish or deter cyber-bullying. 
Assigning criminal liability, however, remains another option. 
B. Existing North Carolina Criminal Law 
Several states have utilized their harassment and stalking laws to 
combat cyber-bullying.157 North Carolina’s stalking law already 
provides a definition of harassment that includes modern internet 
technology: 
Knowing conduct, including written or printed communication or 
transmission, telephone, cellular, or other wireless telephonic 
communication, facsimile transmission, pager messages or 
 
 151.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-538.1 (2017). 
 152.  See Amy L. Tomaszewski, From Columbine To Kazaa: Parental Liability In A New 
World, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 573, 579–80 (2005). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Id. 
 156.  Justin W. Patchin & Sameer Hinduja, Bullies Move Beyond the Schoolyard A 
Preliminary Look at Cyberbullying, 4 YOUTH VIOLENCE & JUV. JUST. 148, 150 (2006). 
 157.  See Allison Lockhart, Online Harassment: Can Cyberbullying Laws Keep Up With 
Technology? 16 PUB. INT. L. REP. 132 (2011). 
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transmissions, answering machine or voice mail messages or 
transmissions, and electronic mail messages or other computerized 
or electronic transmissions directed at a specific person that 
torments, terrorizes, or terrifies that person and that serves no 
legitimate purpose.158 
North Carolina also enacted a criminal cyber-stalking statute in 
2001—long before social networks became commonplace, but well 
after the establishment of the internet.159 The comprehensive statute 
criminalized everything from installing tracking devices160 to 
committing extortion over email.161 If North Carolina were to apply its 
cyber-stalking statute to cyber-bullying, the section most relevant is 
§(b)(2), which makes it unlawful to: 
Electronically mail or electronically communicate to another 
repeatedly, whether or not conversation ensues, for the purpose of 
abusing, annoying, threatening, terrifying, harassing, or 
embarrassing any person.162 
In theory, these laws could provide adequate means to bring 
charges against cyber-bullying activity. Unfortunately, this section may 
not account for the indirect nature of most cyber-bullying offenses.163 
The cyberstalking statute targets electronic transmissions directed at a 
specific person or communicated to another.164 When Robert Bishop 
posted his comments on Facebook, he was not directing them at Dillon 
Price, but instead to his entire social network.165 
Ultimately, these statutes were written to address direct 
communication; they were not constructed for the world of social 
networks. Harassment statutes could potentially cover direct cyber-
bullying, (i.e., cases in which the cyberbully communicates directly to 
the victim). It would be more difficult, however, to apply these laws to 
the indirect form of cyber-bullying in which the harassing 
communications are posted in a “reasonably public area of cyberspace” 
such as Facebook.166 
 
 158.  Stalking, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-277.3A (2015). 
 159.  Cyberstalking, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-196.3. 
 160.  Id. § (a)(3). 
 161.  Id. § (b)(1). 
 162.  Id. § (b)(2). 
 163.  The use of “repeatedly” indicates that the recipient of the excessive communication is 
the protected target, while the use of “any person” suggests that the statute is more focused on 
the act itself. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 815 (N.C. 2016). 
 166.  Susan W. Brenner, ‘Kiddie Crime?’ The Utility of Criminal Law in Controlling 
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C. Criminal law’s Normative and Representative Influence 
While North Carolina is not alone in limiting libel and IIED to the 
world of civil law, criminalizing libel and IIED could serve North 
Carolina’s legitimate interest in eradicating cyber-bullying. The status 
of defamation in the criminal law has ebbed and flowed over the 
centuries, adapting to changes in both public perception and 
technological realities. 
In the early seventeenth century, the English Court of Star 
Chamber assumed the responsibility for controlling speech.167 The 
court developed four separate criminal offenses under the rule of 
criminal libel: seditious libel, blasphemy, obscenity, and defamation.168 
Defamation covered comments directed toward an individual on the 
theory that “they tend[ed] to create breaches of the peace when the 
defamed . . . undert[ook] to revenge themselves on the defamer.”169 
English colonists brought to the New World the understanding that 
criminal libel threatened social order, not just the individual.170 It was 
therefore enforced more stringently than civil libel; truth was not a 
defense.171 This conception of criminal libel has rarely been used in 
American courts. A quantitative study shows that the number of 
criminal libel cases has steadily declined since the turn of the twentieth 
century.172 The drafters of the Model Penal Code cited this decline as a 
factor in deciding “one of the hardest questions” they confronted in 
choosing whether to retain a crime of defamation.173 The drafters 
explained that although “willful public defamation of an individual can 
be a traumatic experience which deserves to be taken . . . seriously,”174 
 
Cyberbullying, 8 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 1, 31. (2009). 
This aspect of indirect cyberbullying gives rise to two issues, neither of which arises with 
direct cyberbullying: (1) to what extent did the cyberbully intentionally direct the online 
communication(s) at the victim; and (2) to what extent did he or she intend the 
communication(s) to be seen by others whose reactions were likely to have a negative 
impact on the victim? 
Id. 
 167.  Susan W. Brenner, Symposium: Prosecution Responses To Internet Victimization: 
Should Online Defamation Be Criminalized?, 76 MISS. L.J. 705, 713 (2007). 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. 
 170.  Id. 
 171.  Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense 
in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 791–92 (1964). 
 172.  Gregory C. Lisby, No Place in the Law: The Ignominy of Criminal Libel in American 
Jurisprudence, 9 COMM. L. & POL’Y 433, 466–67 (2004). 
 173.  MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.7 cmt. at 44 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 13, 1961). 
 174.  Id. at 45. 
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the likelihood of such situations occurring, given the media landscape 
at the time, was not enough to justify criminalizing defamation.175 
Neither the English colonists nor the Model Penal Code drafters 
could have foreseen the monumental change in the publication 
landscape brought forth by the internet. At the time the Model Penal 
Code was drafted, avenues of publication consisted of a limited set of 
professionalized media: radio, network television, and print media.176 
These organizations had both the professional standards to avoid 
irresponsible defamation and the financial ability to provide adequate 
damages when they were liable.177 Moreover, the commercial nature of 
publication resulted in stories and articles that focused on matters of 
public concern that would attract a large audience.178 The media 
industry of the 1960s thus had an economic reason to police itself and 
exercise a fair amount of control to avoid libel and slander suits. 
Operating under this reality, the drafters saw no reason to include any 
form of criminal defamation in the Model Penal Code. 
The democratization of online publication has changed many of the 
assumptions on which the Model Penal Code drafters based their 
decision to omit criminal defamation. Anyone with internet access can 
become a publisher. As such, publishers are no longer required to 
engage in professional vetting procedures to ensure accuracy of the 
published material.179 Because publishing is no longer confined to large 
media organizations, there is no guarantee that one who commits 
defamation could adequately compensate a victim with civil damages. 
Collectively, the current model of publishing differs significantly from 
the model on which the Model Penal Code drafters relied. Thus, the 
reason cited by the drafters for omitting criminal defamation is no 
longer dispositive. 
 
 175.  See id. at 44. (“[O]ur alarm may, as in the case of petty theft or malicious mischief, derive 
from the higher likelihood that such lesser harms will be inflicted upon us by those who manifest 
disregard of other people’s ownership. It seems evident that personal calumny” does not fall in 
this class, and is therefore “inappropriate for penal control.”). 
 176.  Todd Leopold, TV in 1960s vs today: Times have changed, right?, CNN (Aug. 25, 2014) 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/29/showbiz/tv/sixties-television-then-now/index.html. 
 177.  Quint Randle, A Historical Overview of the Effects of New Mass Media Introductions on 
Magazine Publishing During the Twentieth Century, 6 FIRST MONDAY 9 (2001) http://first 
monday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/885/794. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Martin Belam, Journalism in the digital age: trends, tools and technologies, THE 
GUARDIAN, Apr. 14, 2010, https://www.theguardian.com/help/insideguardian/2010/apr/14/ 
journalism-trends-tools-technologies. 
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Despite the drafters’ omission, twenty-three states criminalize 
some form of libel.180 These state statutes focus either on preventing “a 
breach of the peace”181 or preventing an “impeach[ment] [of] the 
honesty, integrity, virtue, or reputation” of a person.182 Alabama, for 
example, enacted a libel law in the mid-nineteenth century that still 
exists today: 
Any person who publishes a libel of another which may tend to 
provoke a breach of the peace shall be punished, on conviction, by 
fine and imprisonment in the county jail, or hard labor for the 
county; the fine not to exceed in any case $500.00 and the 
imprisonment or hard labor not to exceed six months.183 
North Carolina’s sole criminal libel law, however, punishes only 
those who give libelous information concerning any person or 
corporation to a newspaper or periodical, if the newspaper publishes 
it.184 
The status of a law is not considered in a vacuum. Societal views, 
technological limitations, and the development of Supreme Court 
doctrine have all influenced the status of libel laws. Defamation, both 
as libel and slander, has a complex history in common law. Following 
the New York Times decision and the Model Penal Code’s omission, 
defamation’s prevalence in both civil and criminal law declined. Many 
states have no form of criminal defamation, and those that do provide 
different rationales for its criminal status. Some states frame the law in 
terms of maintaining a peaceful society, while others stress the desire 
to prevent harm to the individual. This complex history demonstrates 
the role that external factors play in affecting law. The rise of cyber-
bullying is one such factor, and thus, society has reacted by demanding 
legislation. 
V. CRAFTING A NEW CYBER-BULLYING STATUTE 
The Bishop decision struck down North Carolina’s cyber-bullying 
statute on First Amendment grounds; specifically, its broad language 
failed to reach the narrowest means of protecting children from cyber-
 
 180.  See Lisby, supra note 172, at 479–81. 
 181.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-160 (1975); VA. CODE. § 18.2-417 (2009). 
 182.  See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4801 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.765(1) 
(West 2009); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212(1) (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:11(1) 
(LexisNexis 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-15-01(1) (1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 771 
(West 2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-404(1) (2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 42.01(2) (West 2005). 
 183.  ALA. CODE § 13A-11-160 (1975). 
 184.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-47 (1994). 
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bullying.185 The statute was entirely content-based, containing a list of 
several forms of expression that were prohibited if done “with the 
intent to torment a minor.”186 
If North Carolina were to draft a new statute—one that would 
survive a constitutional challenge—the statute must reframe the issue 
in terms of the harm that cyber-bullying causes. By doing so, the law 
would find roots in traditionally unprotected forms of expression such 
as defamation and IIED instead of listing various forms of online 
activity, thus avoiding the problems discussed by the Bishop court.187 
Instead, by expressing the law in terms of tortious speech, the statute 
would fall within the New York Times’ “private individual-private 
concern” category, further minimizing potential constitutional issues. 
Furthermore, the statute could tether its mens rea component to those 
specific harms, thus satisfying any vagueness challenge as expressed by 
the Bishop court.188 A bill for such a statute may resemble the 
following: 
 
AN ACT PROTECTING CHILDREN OF THIS STATE BY 
MAKING CYBERBULLYING A CRIMINAL OFFENSE 
PUNISHABLE AS A MISDEMEANOR. 
<< N.C.G.S. § 14–196.4 >> 
SECTION 1. This Act shall be known as the Cyber-bullying 
Prevention Act. 
SECTION 2. The purpose of this Act is to protect children from the 
psychological, social, emotional, and physical harms caused by cyber-
bullying. This Act incorporates and punishes the underlying harms 
addressed by common law defamation and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress, as enforced in N.C.G.S. § 4-1. 
SECTION 3. Nothing in this Act is intended to interfere with the 





 185.  State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 817 (N.C. 2016). 
 186.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-458.1(a)(1) (2012). 
 187.  Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 821. 
 188.  Id. 
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SECTION 4. Article 26 of Chapter 14 of the General Statutes is 
amended by adding a new section to read: 
§ 14–196.4. Cyber-bullying; penalty 
(a) The following definitions apply in this section: 
(1) Cyber-bullying.—an act or acts exhibited by one person or 
group of people to a minor or group of minors through any 
form of electronic communication that: 
a. with the intent to cause such harm: 
1. endangers the psychological, emotional, or 
physical health of a minor, including, but not limited to, 
causing fear, anxiety, depression, neurosis, phobia, 
paranoia, or any other type of severe and disabling 
emotional or mental condition that may be generally 
recognized and diagnosed by professionals trained to 
do so; 
2. misleads a person or group of people in order to 
harass a minor, substantially disgrace and degrade a 
minor, subject a minor to public hatred, hostility, 
contempt or ridicule, or cause a minor to be shunned 
and avoided; or 
3. otherwise bullies or harasses a minor, as described 
in § 115C-407.15. 
(2) Electronic communication.—any transfer of signs, signals, 
writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature 
transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic 
system, photo-electronic system, or photo-optical  system, or 
other transmission or medium such as electronic mail, text 
messaging, instant messaging, social media, internet 
communications, or facsimile communications. 
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person to use any form of electronic 
communication to engage in any act of cyber-bullying: 
(1) in which the victim subjectively views the conduct as cyber-
bullying; and 
(2) the conduct is objectively severe or pervasive enough that a 
reasonable person would agree that it is cyber-bullying. 
(c) Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of cyber-
bullying, which shall be punishable as a Class 1 misdemeanor if the 
defendant is 18 years of age or older at the time the offense is 
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committed. If the defendant is under the age of 18 at the time the 
offense is committed, the offense shall be punishable as a Class 2 
misdemeanor. 
SECTION 5. This act becomes effective upon enactment, and 
applies to offenses committed on or after that date. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Cyber-bullying is a serious and recurrent problem that harms 
children. The increased access and growing dependence on electronic 
communication and online social networks give cyber-bullies more 
avenues to inflict harm on their victims. North Carolina’s valiant effort 
to address this phenomenon fell short after the ruling in State v. Bishop. 
The statute was flawed, and the court held that it infringed upon the 
First Amendment. 
A statute crafted with more care could achieve the same goal while 
avoiding any constitutional limitations. North Carolina’s robust 
common law can offer a source of relief for victims of cyber-bullying. 
The torts of libel and intentional infliction of emotional distress seek to 
remedy psychological and dignitary harms like those experienced by 
cyber-bullying victims. By navigating the Supreme Court’s intersection 
of the First Amendment and such harmful speech, North Carolina can 
impose civil liability, including punitive damages, using its common law 
torts. However, if the legislature wants to reflect the views of society 
and prevent cyber-bullying instead of compensating for it indirectly 
through parental liability, the legislature should turn to the criminal law. 
Whether the legislature expands existing harassment law, incorporates 
the common law torts into the criminal law, or redrafts a cyber-bullying 
statute that complies with the First Amendment, criminalizing cyber-
bullying is both constitutional and a fervent societal condemnation of 
bullying in the twenty-first century. 
 
